

TOP SECRET GCHS RUFF

WORKING PAPER

PAD 73/62
7 June 1962

MEMORANDUM TO: Operations Officer, NPIC

FROM: BIO/CIA concrete evidence of this to date.

SUBJECT: Comments on Draft [redacted] of the average of eight
AA's for the month of May 1962. The average of eight
should not be maintained. A 50% saving, or over 1 man-day, could be
quite realistic.

1. Para. 2: If this is true, why then is SAC producing MCI's
and as in the most recent case, SAC's MCI on 9032 is published and
disseminated long before NPIC's. Who is duplicating effort--NPIC or
SAC?

2. Para. 3: We have never produced a true index even for a short
time.

3. Para. 4: CIA Detachment did not "recommend that only the header
line appear in future MCI's". See PAD 40/62, [redacted] dated
9 April 1962, paragraph 3, and Attachment A.

4. Para. 5a: The MCI definition given contains precisely what the
CIA Detachment recommended, except for data being rearranged between
the first and second lines, and minus the coverage plot. The arrange-
ment suggested by PAD would permit the first line to be non-PI data with
the PI only having to furnish the second line data.

5. Para. 7: 9032 MCI started 27 April and the PI portion terminated
on 1 June, some 25 days. PAD had 15 different people committed to the MCI
averaging 11 PI's full time:

7a (MCI): Better perhaps to consider a saving of PI time of
50%.

7a (MCS): We do not believe this statement would really stand
up under close inspection.

7b (MCS): This we feel would be found to be a really minor
consideration if actually checked.

7c (MCS): We confidently feel that an MCI would effect a
50% saving of PI time--plus that of editors,
DMD types, etc. In the case of 9032, a saving
of over 120 PI man-days in PAD alone would have
resulted, as well as lesser savings on edit
time, DMD support, etc. A real look at the
situation we believe would show the major
saving to be in PI time.

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EF	✓		
PUTY	✓		
	✓		
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PAD 73/62
Page 2

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7d (MCS): No concrete evidence of this to date.

We also feel that 26 T-type missions involving an average of eight PI's for an average of 4.5 days which could consume some 936 man-days should not be minimized. A 50% saving, or over 1 man-year, could be quite productive otherwise.

Comparison of T-type MCI figures with those for satellite take:

26 T-type
8 PI's
4.5 days = 936 man-days

8 satellite-type
40 PI's
16 days (13-20) = 5120 man-days

Estimated 50% saving of PI time by doing MCI:

50% of 936
50% of 5120 = a saving of 3028 PI man-days

6. Conclusion:

- a. We strongly recommend again that NPIC seriously consider doing an Index as set forth in your paper (page 2, para. 5a).
- b. We feel it would be dereliction of duty to strap the Center by insisting on continuing the MCS (current MCI).
- c. We also strongly recommend, as part of the proposed MCI, a coverage plot as submitted in PAD [redacted] dated 9 April 1962.

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Disagree that material PI savings are not implicit in our approach to MCI. The time saving is almost all in the PI area. (page 1.)

The # of reports derived from the CIA/PAD program would not be materially ~~reduced~~ reduced by period of MCS or MCI.

The users of CIA/PAD all have contact with our analysts and get better coordination than by submitting reports in vacuum - doesn't feel pad MCS item as, is valid.


Definition of MCI (page 1 P 4) is not valid under PAD concept as our intent is only to identify fact that install is comparable a given frame. This is a rapid identification process materially reducing PI time

[Signature]

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Comments to

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1) p1 para 3. I don't believe we ever produced a true index.

2) p2 para 4. CIA did not recommend "that only the header line appear in future RSC's". We did say that a header line and a second line including camera information and image description be the entry for an individual target. (See para 5 a)

3) p3 para 7. @ There is a strong possibility we can effect more than 8 satellite missions.

④ Mission 9032 took nearly 25 days of P1 time and approx. an additional 5-8 days coordinators, editing and DND time before publication.


⑤ although the "primary

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problem is the satellite
 take "T" type missions
 should not be brushed
 off lightly particularly
 26 of them (an average
 of 3 1/2 to 4 a month).


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④ Page 4 can take obvious
 exception to each of
 the "pro arguments
 for a MCS" as Ray
 has pointed out.
 These arguments for
 a MCS have been
 advanced by reps of
 the military detach
 not CIA/PAD and perhaps
 should be pointed
 out in a paper of this
 sort.

⑤ Other comments
 a. Generally, aside from
 above comments this
 paper appears to be
 compatible with our

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line of thinking
 b. Some mention somewhere
 should be made of
 the fact that SAC is
 also producing a MCI
 which strongly
 resembles NPK's.

c. I think, perhaps,
 a compromise solution
 would be agreeable
 to all along the
 following lines.


1. a two line entry
 similar to what we
 propose for an MCI
 except for new targets,
 major changes to old
 targets and aircraft,
 naval vessels and
 mil. equip counts.
 (I have jotted down
 some more details
 on this approach.)

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CHIEF	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DEPUTY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
IPO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SEC	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



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5 June 1962

Copy 3**MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, NPIC****SUBJECT:**

Revision of MCI Procedures

1. A number of meetings have been held recently to discuss possible ways of revising existing MCI procedures to reduce the amount of effort required to produce an MCI on each TALENT-KEYHOLE mission.

2. According to the NSCID #8, NPIC is charged with "preliminary interpretation" and the production of "indexes". Neither of these is clearly defined and thus leaves to the Director, NPIC, the determination as to the exact nature of each. Obviously, he is guided by community requirements and needs. To date, the OAK report encompassed "preliminary interpretation" whereas the MCI was the "index".

3. We previously produced an MCS which generally is little different than the MCI. Attempts were made to reduce the content of the MCS and produce only a true index called an MCI. For a short time this procedure was followed, but in recent months we have reverted to greater detail.

4. With the expected increase in numbers of missions it appeared imperative, to various components of the Center, that we review the scope of our current MCI. At present, it contains a standardized "header" line followed by a description of the facility indexed. The MCI is a frame by

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SUBJECT: Revision of MCI Procedures

frame analysis of photography; the intelligence information derived therefrom being recorded in accordance with FAS Interim Procedures # _____ (Encl #1). The CIA Detachment has recommended that only the "header" line appear in future MCI's and that plot sheets be included pinpointing the location of those facilities indexed. It immediately became apparent that one of the first tasks to be resolved is to settle the question of what is an MCI and what is an MCS.

5. It is recommended that the following definitions be adopted by the Center:

a. MISSION COVERAGE INDEX - A photographic intelligence publication listing targets of intelligence interest imaged on the photography of a given mission. This listing would consist of a one-line "header" including: Location, name, geographic coordinates, DE Number, and NPIC target number. On the next line would appear the pass, frame, grid coordinates (X&Y), a one-word statement as to quality and letters designating cloud cover, etc. (See Encl 2 for sample)

b. MISSION COVERAGE SUMMARY - A photographic intelligence publication consisting of targets of intelligence interest imaged on the photography of a given mission, together with a capsule description covering the salient features of each target. The MCS, which is based on a rapid scan of the photography is intended to be a listing (together with a statement of interpretability) of man-made objects covered in sufficient detail to

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SECRET**SUBJECT: Revision of MCI Procedures**

5. It would not generate more national products; also
 (a) provide for a basic retrieval capability and (b) furnish only
 minimum information necessary for the reader to levy logical and
 effective requirements on the Center for detailed studies.
 (See Encl. 3).

6. If these definitions are accepted for clarity purposes, we must
 agree that our current MCI in fact is actually an MCS. The extent of
 descriptive content is based on current operating procedures.

7. Let us next look at the possible need for a change to the MCI
 version. During the balance of the calendar year we can expect about
 eight satellite missions; an increase of 400%. At present we require
 about 40 PI's for 13-20 days to produce our MCS. We can expect about
 26 TALENT-type missions, but these require an average of eight PI's for
 an average of 4.5 days to produce the MCS. It should be noted, however,
 that the primary problem is the satellite take. The question arises,
 should we cut-back on MCS and produce only an MCI to save time, and what
 actual economies could thereby be effected? Some of the pros for an MCI
 follow:

- a. Approximately seven days could be cut from the total
 production time on a good quality full length mission.
 - b. Specialists required for detailed work could be released
 sooner which in turn would aid morale by not keeping the PI on
 the more tedious scan task.
- up our PI capability beyond a point where support can be rendered.

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c. It would not generate more national projects, since

currently regardless of the extent to which targets are described,

NPIC still receives requirements on "hot" items.

d. The target briefs would not require as much up-dating as

in the case of the MCS.

On the other hand pro arguments for an MCS follow:

a. The user analyst requires as much information as

possible in order to levy proper requirements; the MCS is

highly regarded in the Community.

b. The number of requirements levied on the Center would be reduced.

c. Less than three days would be saved by an MCI and little of that on the part of the FI.

d. Continued procedural improvement could achieve as much savings in effort as changes in format.

8. The CIA/PAD (NPIC) has canvassed CIA users who feel an MCI would suffice, whereas the Military indicate it would not serve the user adequately. As stated in the definition there are two purposes, one of which is to provide the user with "a capsule summary".

9. To operate the FI's on a two-shift basis means we get less from the FI's per shift. Furthermore, we cannot overlook the capability of the support elements of the Center. Unless these components are manned adequately to cope with these products there is no point in "beefing" up our FI capability beyond a point where support can be rendered.

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10. As stated earlier, the NSCID #8 gives NPIC two major functions in addition to detailed reporting; i.e., "immediate reporting" and preparation of an "index". No time limit has been set on the latter. Since immediate reporting is primary, the production of the MCS might have to be deferred, consistent with our capability to handle it based on space and manpower limitations.

11. I have submitted the foregoing to the Operations Board for their consideration. It is the considered opinion of the Board that:

1. Item 5: The MCI information system contains many items that are not needed for the MCI. It is suggested that the MCI be revised to include only the items that are needed for the MCI. This would be a major revision and would require a lot of work.

2. Item 7: The MCI should be revised to include only the items that are needed for the MCI. This would be a major revision and would require a lot of work.

Distribution: (S) 1. To the MCI Board for their consideration. 2. To the MCI Board for their consideration.

- Cy 1 & 2 - CO/NPIC
- 3 - SIO/CIA
- 4 - SIO/Army
- 5 - SIO/Navy
- 6 - SIO/AF

This is not to be used as a really serious consideration if actually needed.

To (S) 1. To the MCI Board for their consideration. 2. To the MCI Board for their consideration.

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